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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the determinants of the
local public expenditures and, in particular, try to explain the so called
’ﬂypaper eﬀect’. The analysis uses a political economy model to relate
the existence and size of the ﬂypaper eﬀect to observable municipal
characteristics such as the average tax base, income dispersion and
whether or not a change in the average tax base aﬀects the tax share
of the majority voter. The empirical part of the study is based on
Swedish data on municipal expenditures and revenues for the period
1996-2004. The results show that the size of the ﬂypaper eﬀect varies
among municipalities depending on the relative composition of grant
and tax base.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper addresses the question of whether the source of local public rev-
enue matters for the size of local public expenditures. To be more speciﬁc,
does an increase in the tax revenues (due to an increase in the tax base)
aﬀect the expenditures in the same way as a transfer payment (e.g., grant)
of the same size from the central government? According to the basic median
voter model, where the tax price is treated as exogenous from the perspec-
tive of the median voter, the source of public revenues does not matter in
this respect.1 This is so because a transfer payment from the central to the
local government is eﬀectively equivalent to a transfer payment to the deci-
sive voter. However, there is an extensive empirical literature that ﬁnds that
local public spending responds more to increased transfers from the central
government than to a corresponding increase in the tax base, an empirical
ﬁnding that has been labelled the ”ﬂypaper eﬀect”.2 This paper investigates
the determinants of municipal expendit u r e si nS w e d e na n d ,i np a r t i c u l a r ,
how the composition of grants and tax base as well as the distribution of
private income contribute to the ﬂypaper eﬀect. The empirical application
is based on panel data for the period 1996-2004.
Several competing hypotheses aim to explain the ﬂypaper eﬀect: ﬁscal
1See Bradford and Oates (1971a,b).
2The result was labelled the “ﬂypaper eﬀect” by Cournant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld
(1979) following Arthur Okun’s observation that “money sticks where it hits”.
2illusion (Cournant et al., 1979; Oates, 1979), budget maximizing by gov-
ernment agents (Romer and Rosenthal, 1980), uncertainty and risk aversion
(Fosset, 1990; Turnbull, 1992), mental accounting (Hines and Thaler, 1995)
etc.3 None of these studies model the ﬂypaper eﬀect explicitly in a theoret-
ical context. This paper focuses, instead, on income heterogeneity, and the
regression equation will be related to a background theoretical model, where
voters diﬀer with respect to income.
T h ee v i d e n c ef o rt h ee x i s t e n c eo faﬂypaper eﬀect is ambiguous. The early
empirical literature dealing with the ﬂypaper eﬀect was criticized for not sep-
arating lump-sum grants from matching grants. Moﬃt (1984) emphasized
the problem of ignoring the simultaneous determination of matching grants
and public expenditures. Recent studies addressing these problems have been
criticized for using an inappropriate functional form, e.g., studies that use a
linear-in-variables functional form often found support for a ﬂypaper eﬀect,
while studies based on logarithms of all variables found no support (Becker,
1996; Worthington and Dollery, 1999). Hamilton (1983) contends that em-
pirical support for the ﬂypaper eﬀect is aﬀected by the omitted variable
biases. Subsequent eﬀorts to correct for omitted variables that may correlate
with intergovernmental transfers came to diﬀerent conclusions regarding the
ﬂypaper eﬀect (Knight, 2002; Gordon, 2004; Dahlberg et al., 2007). Empiri-
cal support for a ﬂypaper eﬀect has generally been demonstrated for certain
situations, rather than across the board. For example, the eﬀect has been
shown to occur for diﬀerent kinds of municipalities and diﬀerent categories of
expenditures (Moisio, 2002). Other studies have found that the response in
local public expenditures to a change in the lump-sum transfers from the cen-
3A good survey is given by Bailey and Connolly (1998).
3tral government is asymmetric, depending on whether the transfer increases
or decreases (Gramlich, 1987; Gamkhar and Oates, 1996; Karlsson, 2006).
This paper presents a simple political model for local public expenditures,
where the voters are divided into two groups: low-income and high-income
earners. The results imply that the source of marginal revenue (i.e. whether
it originates from an increase in the transfers or an increase in the tax base)
will matter for the local public expenditure decision, and that the eﬀect on
the majority voters’ tax share, caused by a change in the tax base, will be
crucial for ﬁnding a ﬂypaper eﬀect. The intuition is that a change in the
private income for any of the two voter groups aﬀects the relative ﬁnancial
burden (tax share) of the majority voter group and, therefore, its willingness
to use taxation as a marginal source of funds for public expenditures. In
addition to income levels of the majority voters, the model emphasizes that
the spread of private income will be important for local public expenditures.4
The empirical part of the paper estimates a model of local public ex-
penditures from Swedish municipalities and tests for a ﬂypaper eﬀect. The
local characteristics that aﬀect the ﬂypaper eﬀect according to the theoret-
ical model, such as the average tax base, the distribution of private income
and the relative number of low income earners, will also be considered in the
regressions. The data is particularly suited for studying the ﬂypaper eﬀect
because transfers from the central to the local government in Sweden are, to
a large extent, general grants. The use of general grants eliminates (at least
in principle) the risk that grants and expenditures are determined simulta-
4Using US data Todo-Rovira (1991) found that income dispersion among voters matters
when explaining local public expenditures. King (1984) also found that heterogeneity in
income matters for the public expenditure decision.
4neously. The empirical analysis ﬁnds evidence of ﬂypaper eﬀects in Sweden
during the study period.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, a political model for
local public expenditures is presented and discussed. The empirical part of
the study is carried out in Section 3. Section 4 summarizes the results and
concludes.
2 A Political Model for Local Public Expen-
ditures
Consider a municipality that consists of two types of immobile residents who
diﬀer in ability; a low-ability type and a high-ability type. Let ni denote
the number of individuals of ability-type i. Ability-type i derives utility
from the consumption of a private good, ci, and from the consumption of
public services, g. The consumption of private goods is determined by the
net income, ci = wi(1 − t), where wi is the gross income and t is the income
tax rate, while the consumption of the public service is determined via the
public expenditure decision. We assume that the utility function is separable




where the functions v(·)a n dz(·) are assumed to be increasing and strictly
concave in their respective arguments.
The local government raises revenues by using the proportional labour
income tax and receives a lump-sum transfer, b, from the central govern-
ment. If ability-type i is the majority voter, the resource allocation will be
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The ﬂypaper eﬀect will be evaluated by examining whether an increase in the
tax base aﬀects the municipal expenditures in the same way as an increase
in the transfer payment from the central government. The tax base and the
transfer payment are considered exogenous from the local government’s point
of view.
At the same time, note that a change in the tax base may, in addition
to its eﬀect on the municipality’s budget, imply a change in the income
distribution among the residents in the municipality. This additional eﬀect
(previously not discussed in the ﬂypaper literature) does not appear when the
transfer payment changes. As a point of reference in the theoretical analysis,
I will measure the ﬂypaper eﬀect by comparing the eﬀect on the local public
expenditures following an increase in the transfer payment with the eﬀect of
6a spread-preserving increase in the mean private income. Deﬁne the mean
p r i v a t ei n c o m e( o ra v e r a g et a xb a s e )a n dt h ew a g ed i ﬀerential between the
high-ability type and the low-ability type as ¯ w =( niwi+njwj)/(ni+nj)a n d
˜ s = wj − wi, respectively. For further use, note also that wi and wj can be
written in terms of ¯ w and ˜ s
w









Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to ¯ w and b,h o l d i n g
˜ s constant and denoting the Hessian determinant by | ¯ H|, yields
∂g/∂¯ w = −[(n
i + n
j)tρ + ζδ]/| ¯ H| (10)
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We are now ready to analyze if the source of local public revenue matters for
the local public expenditures.
2.1 Implications of Income Heterogeneity
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The magnitude of the expression on the right hand side of equation (12)
depends on local characteristics, ( ¯ w,˜ s,ni,n j). A ﬂypaper eﬀect exists if
a transfer payment from the central government stimulates the municipal
expenditures more than an increase of the same size in the tax base, i.e.
(∂g/∂b)/(∂g/∂¯ w) > 1 . T h eo p p o s i t ee ﬀect, (∂g/∂b)/(∂g/∂¯ w) < 1, will be
referred to as a ’negative’ ﬂypaper eﬀect. The elasticity of marginal utility
with respect to consumption,  i,r e ﬂects the curvature of the utility function
(the relation between  i and the ﬂypaper eﬀect is analyzed in Appendix).5
Equation (12) implies that (∂g/∂b)/(∂g/∂¯ w) = 1 if, and only if, ϕi =1 .
Let us begin by considering two special cases when this will occur. First, if
˜ s =0(¯ w = wi = wj), the majority voter will represent a single ability-type
in the local economy and the result corresponds to that of a one-consumer
model. The marginal valuation of private consumption is, in this case, equal
to the marginal valuation of public consumption, i.e. λ/vi
c ≡ 1. Second,
the source of marginal revenue does not matter for the public expenditures
when the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to private consumption,
 i, equals minus one.6 This result is further discussed in the Appendix.
5This elasticity is also known as the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, deﬁned as
εi = | i|, when the utility function is used to describe attitudes towards risk.
6Consider a Cobb-Douglas form of v(ci), i.e., vi =( 1 /(1 − a)) × (ci)1−a.I f a = | i|
approaches 1, then the utility function approaches a logarithmic utility function, for which
(∂g/∂b)/(∂g/∂ ¯ w)=1 .
8Returning to the general model, note that a ﬂypaper eﬀect can only exist if
ϕi < 1. For | i| < 1, this requires that wi <w j (˜ s>0). A spread-preserving
increase in the mean tax base implies that the tax share of the majority
voters increases if the majority voters earn a low income. As a relatively
larger ﬁnancial burden falls on the majority voters, taxation becomes a less
attractive source of marginal funds for the municipality from the view of the
majority voters. In this case, diﬀerentiation of equation (12) shows that the
ﬂypaper eﬀect decreases, as the mean tax base, ¯ w, increases. Under the same
conditions, an increase in the number of the low-income earners, ni, reduces
t h es i z eo ft h eﬂypaper eﬀect, whereas an increase in the spread of income,
˜ s, increases the size of the ﬂypaper eﬀect, ceteris paribus.7
Let us also consider the situation where the high-income earners are the
majority voters. If | i| < 1, this means that ϕi > 1. In this case, we ﬁnd
a’ n e g a t i v e ’ﬂypaper eﬀect, i.e. (∂g/∂b)/(∂g/∂¯ w) < 1. The intuition is
analogous to that given above. On the other hand, if | i| > 1, and the high-
income earners are in majority, we have (∂g/∂b)/(∂g/∂¯ w) > 1, indicating
that a ﬂypaper eﬀect exists.8
As we indicated above, it is not entirely clear from earlier empirical lit-
erature how the ﬂypaper eﬀect should be measured. What happens if we do
not condition on income spread, or if we were to control for spread in such
7The Cobb-Douglas form of v(ci) mentioned in footnote 6 yields | i| = a.D i ﬀerentiation
of equation (12) with respect to a shows that the ﬂypaper eﬀect decreases as the marginal
utility of private income decreases (i.e. as a increases), if the low-ability type is decisive.
8The majority of estimates in the literature estimating the coeﬃcient of relative risk
aversion are in the interval 0.5 − 2. Blanchard and Fischer (1989) refer to the empirical
evidence based on consumption choices over time, where the estimates vary substantially,
but usually lie around or above unity.
9a way that the relative private income remains unaﬀected when the average
tax base increases? If we were to increase the majority voters’ income with-
out controlling for income spread (i.e. increase wi with wj held constant),
and then compare the resulting change in g with the eﬀect of an additional
transfer payment of the same size, we would expect to ﬁnd a ﬂypaper eﬀect,
independent of the ability-type in majority (at least if | i| < 1a n dt h ed e r i v -
ative ∂ i/∂ ¯ w is suﬃciently small). By analogy, an increase in the minority
voters’ tax share makes taxable income a more attractive source of marginal
funds for the municipality. In this case we would, therefore, expect to ﬁnd a
’negative’ ﬂypaper eﬀect. Finally, if the tax share of each voter group remains
unaﬀected, then (∂g/∂b)/(∂g/∂ ¯ w) = 1, and we are back in the traditional
representative agent model.
3 Empirical Analysis
The empirical part of the paper begins with a presentation of some institu-
tional characteristics related to the intergovernmental transfer system as well
as a description of the data. The empirical model and the estimation results
follow.
3.1 Data and Institutional Characteristics
The sample consists of a panel containing 290 Swedish municipalities over a
nine year period (1996-2004.)9 The data were obtained from Statistics Swe-
9The number of Swedish municipalities increased during the study period from 288
(1996-1998) to 289 (1999-2002) to 290 (2003). Three large municipalities are excluded from
the study (Malm¨ o, G¨ oteborg and Gotland) due to partly joint expenditures between the
10den and the Swedish Labour Market Board. Swedish municipalities collect
tax revenues by using a proportional income tax. This tax is the most im-
portant source of funds for the majority of municipalities, followed by user
fees and general grants.10 The study chooses this particular period due to a
signiﬁcant policy change in 1993 regarding transfers from the central govern-
ment to the municipalities. The Swedish intergovernmental transfer system
is built around formula-based general grants which, in theory, eliminate the
risk that transfers and expenditures are determined simultaneously. The pol-
icy reform implemented in 1993 replaced most matching grants by a system
of general grants.11 The current system contains two parts. First, a transfer
from the central government to the municipalities, which is interpretable as a
general grant based on the number of residents in the municipality. Second,
the system also contains an element of revenue sharing in the sense that re-
sources are redistributed among municipalities such that municipalities with
high taxable income or low structural costs compensate municipalities with
low taxable income or high structural costs.12 Therefore, for the former type
of municipality, our measure of total grant may be negative.
municipality and the region. In addition, seven observations are excluded due to missing
values in the dependent variable (see Greene, 2003). This leaves us with an unbalanced
panel containing between 282 and 287 municipalities.
10During the study period (1996-2004), the tax revenues as a share of the total revenues
decreased from 68.2 % to 67.4 % for the municipalities while the unconditional transfers
decreased from 11.6 % to 9.4 % on average.
11In addition to the general grants, a smaller amount of matching grants was also used
by the central government during the period of study.
12A minor reform was implemented in 1996, when the equalization part of the system
was made ﬁnancially neutral from the view of the central government (see Law Proposition
1995/96:64). The calculation of the grant formulas was subject to minor modiﬁcations in
1998 (see Law Proposition 1998/99:89).
11Let us now turn to the variables to be used in the estimations. The
municipality’s total net operating expenditure, g, is the dependent variable.
This includes the sum of expenditure on child care, elderly care, compulsory
education etc.13 The expenditure variable is adjusted by Statistics Sweden
to ensure that it measures the running expenditures net of fees and matching
grants. Variables characterizing a municipality’s revenue, beside the exoge-
nous grant variable, b,a n dt h et a xb a s e ,¯ w, are therefore not considered in
the analysis. All monetary variables are expressed in real per capita terms
using the Swedish CPI (2004 is the base year).
The measure of income spread used in Section 2 is operationalized by
using the standard deviation of private income, which is estimated annually
for each municipality.14 As discussed in the theoretical section above, the
existence of a ﬂypaper eﬀe c td e p e n d so nt h er e l a t i v es i z eo ft h em a j o r i t yv o t -
ers’ private income. This will be taken into account by introducing a variable
measuring the relative number of low-income earners in each municipality.
A low-income earner is deﬁned as a citizen earning less than 200,000 SEK
per year, adjusted by the Swedish CPI (based year 2004).15 This deﬁnition
13The municipalities’ business activities are excluded from the analysis.
14Data on the income distribution in each municipality is collected by Statistics Sweden.
The following intervals are deﬁned for the period 1996-1997; 0, 0.1-39.9, 40-59.9, 60-79.9,
80-99.9, 100-119.9, 120-139.9, 140-159.9, 160-179.9, 180-199.9, 200-219.9, 220-259.9, 260-
299.9, 300-399.9, 400+, and the following for 1998-2004; 0, 0.1-39.9, 40-79.9, 80-119.9,
120-159.9, 160-199.9, 200-239.9, 240-279.9, 280-319.9, 320-359.9, 360-399.9, 400-499.9, 500-
599.9, 600+. The data refers to the number of residents in each interval. The income is
reported in current prices (thousands of SEK). The standard deviation is estimated for
each municipality and each year by using the mean income in the municipality and applying
a lognormal density function to the income distribution.
15This threshold earnings level is chosen because the interval 0-199.9 is given for the
12implies that the share of low-income earners in all municipalities decreases
over time, on average, from 72 % in 1996 to 57 % in 2004, due to economic
growth and inﬂation. Therefore, in order to adjust for economic growth and
inﬂation, the annual share of low-income earners in the municipality is re-
lated to the annual share of low-income earners in the country. A dummy
variable, d, equals one if the share of low-income earners in the municipality
is larger than the share of low-income earners in the country.16
Following the literature on the determinants of municipal expenditures,
the estimations will include relevant local characteristics such as population
density, age structure of the population, political preferences and political
strength. The population density, Dens, is measured by the number of res-
idents per square kilometre. The classiﬁcation of the age variables corre-
sponds to the formulas used when calculating the structural cost due to the
age structure in the municipalities. Political preferences are controlled by
including the share of the seats in the municipal parliament occupied by
members of either the Social Democratic Party or the Left Party, Left.P o -
litical strength is represented by a Herﬁndahl index, Herf, i.e. the sum of
the squared shares of each party in the local parliament. Finally, a variable
measuring the unemployment rate, Unempl,i sa l s oi n c l u d e da sac o n t r o l
variable.17 National income tax and expenditure policy are not included in
entire period (see previous footnote). The number of residents earning less than 200,000
SEK per year, adjusted by the CPI (2004 is the base year), is calculated by using a
lognormal distribution. Use of this threshold income level implies that low-income earners
are exempt from paying income tax to the central government. Measured in 2004 prices,
earnings that exceeded 249,000 in 1996 or 308,000 in 2004 were subject to this additional
income tax.
16This is the case for 1469 observations out of 2566.
17Other control variables were also tested, but these had no eﬀect on the qualitative
13the analysis.18 Descriptive and summary statistics for these variables are
presented in Tables A1-A2 in the Appendix.
3.2 Speciﬁcation of the Empirical Model
We will ﬁrst consider a benchmark version of the model where the ﬂypaper
eﬀect is measured in the same way as in the earlier empirical literature. In
this speciﬁcation, the municipalities’ expenditures, g, are explained solely by
the grants, b, the sum of the grant and the tax base, θ,a n db yt h es t a n d a r d
determinants of local government expenditures, x. The estimating equation
is given by
git = β0 + β1bit + β2θit + β11xit + µi + γt + εit (13)
where subindex i refers to municipality and subindex t to time period. The
parameter µi is a municipality speciﬁce ﬀect, γt a year speciﬁce ﬀect, and εit
is an error term. In order to be able to test the existence of a ﬂypaper eﬀect,
the variable θ is deﬁned as the sum of the general grant and the tax base,
i.e. θ = b +¯ w. According to the benchmark model, an increase in the grant
results discussed below. For example, alternative classiﬁcations of the age variables, a
version of the Left-variable where the Environmental party is included and a version of
the Unemployment-variable which includes persons in vocational training.
18The models to be estimated contain municipality speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects and period
speciﬁce ﬀects. As is common in earlier comparable literature, we abstract from the
inﬂuences of central government taxation and expenditures on the municipal expenditures
(see description of models in the next section).
14aﬀects the municipal expenditures in the same way as an increase in the tax
base if β1 =0 ;aﬂypaper eﬀect exists if β1 > 0.
The ﬁrst extension of the benchmark model means that the standard
deviation of private income, ˜ s, is part of the set of explanatory variables.
git = β0 + β1bit + β2θit + β3˜ sit + β4˜ sitbit + β5˜ sitθit (14)
+β11xit + µi + γt + εit
The standard deviation of private income enters the regression both as a
separate eﬀect and as an interaction eﬀect with b and θ, respectively. These
variables will also be present in the other extensions discussed below.
The second extension aims to test whether the ﬂypaper eﬀect is larger in
municipalities with a higher share of low-income earners than in other mu-
nicipalities. This will be done by using the dummy variable, d, distinguishing
municipalities with a relatively high share of low-income earners, both as a
separate eﬀect and as interaction eﬀects with b and θ.
git = β0 + β1bit + β2θit + β3˜ sit + β4˜ sitbit + β5˜ sitθit (15)
+β6dit + β7ditbit + β8ditθit + β11xit + µi + γt + εit
Finally, the third extension aims to estimate a ﬂypaper eﬀe c tt h a tc a p -
tures non-linear properties in the revenue variables. This allows the ﬂypaper
eﬀect to vary between municipalities depending on the relative composition
of grants and taxable income. The composition of grants and tax base in the
municipality is closely related to the relative number of low-income earners.
More speciﬁcally, this extension means that the square of the grant and the
15square of the variable measuring the sum of grants and taxable income are
added to the regressors.19
git = β0 + β1bit + β2θit + β3˜ sit + β4˜ sitbit + β5˜ sitθit (16)
+β9ˆ b
2
it + β10ˆ θ
2
it + β11xit + µi + γt + εit
The inclusion of the quadratic eﬀects results in a less restrictive model com-
pared to the linear speciﬁcations. The null hypotheses to be tested in the
models presented above, which imply that the local public spending does not
depend on the source of marginal revenue, are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Null Hypotheses
Model (∂g/∂b)/(∂g/∂¯ w)N u l l H y p o t h e s i s
[I]B e n c h m a r kM o d e l
β1+β2
β2 β1 =0
[II] First Extended Model
β1+β2+(β4+β5)˜ sit
β2+β5˜ sit β1 = β4 =0
[III]D u m m yV a r i a b l eM o d e l
β1+β2+(β4+β5)˜ sit+(β7+β8)dit
β2+β5˜ sit+β8dit β1 = β4 = β7 =0
[IV] Quadratic Model
β1+β2+(β4+β5)˜ sit+2β9ˆ b+2β10ˆ θ
β2+β5˜ sit+2β10ˆ θ β1 = β4 = β9 =0
Following most other earlier studies on local public expenditure deter-
mination, we assume that the tax base can be treated as exogenous in the
regression.20 To test this assumption, this paper instruments for the tax
19The means are subtracted from the variables, before taking the square, in order to
reduce the multicollinarity between the linear and quadratic terms, i.e. ˆ b2
it =( bit − ¯ b)2
and ˆ θ2
it =( θit − ¯ θ)2. The short period of study motivates the use of the global means.
20The assumption of exogeneity has been questioned. For example, empirical stud-
ies based on Swedish data imply that a change in taxation aﬀects the labour supply
(Blomquist, 1983; Aronsson and Palme, 1998), and to some extent migratory behaviour
(Westerlund and Wyzan, 1995).
16base by using the indicators of industry structure in each municipality or
time-lags of the tax base as instrumental variables. However, the potential
instruments failed the validity test thus precluding their use in this study.21
3.3 Results
T h ee s t i m a t i o nr e s u l t sa r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e2 . 22 First, we present several
speciﬁcation tests.23 A Hausman test implies that a ﬁxed eﬀects model is pre-
ferred to a random eﬀects model in all speciﬁcations estimated. A Bhargava
et al. modiﬁed Durbin-Watson (DW) test examines whether the residuals
are serially correlated.24 Two null hypotheses are both rejected in all models
estimated: (1) that the residuals are serially independent and (2) that the
residuals form a random walk. Moreover, a modiﬁed Wald test for group-
wise heteroskedasticity in the ﬁxed eﬀects model (denoted ’Hettest’ in Table
21Hansen’s J-test rejects the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated
with the error term. This test is applicable in the presence of serial correlation and
heteroskedasticity.
22For the municipalities included in the regressions, the grant revenue can be either
positive or negative. Using the entire sample increases estimate precision. Nevertheless,
the qualitative results discussed below hold even when municipalities with non-positive
grant revenues are excluded.
23The part of the general grants that compensate for structural cost diﬀerences depends
on local characteristics. The compensation for structural cost diﬀerences may, as a conse-
quence, be correlated with potentially omitted variables. It is, therefore, important to be
aware of the possibility that unobservable factors simultaneously aﬀect the equalization
of structural cost diﬀerences and expenditures. Estimations have, therefore, also been
made for the situation where the part of the grant variable that equalizes structural cost
diﬀerences has been excluded. The estimation results reported in Table 2 are robust to
these changes.
24The critical values can be found in Bhargava et al. (1982).
172; see Greene, 2003) rejects the null of homoskedasticity. The existence of
serial correlation and groupwise heteroskedasticity in the ﬁxed eﬀects model
implies that the estimates of the standard errors need to be corrected. This
is done using White’s estimator of the variance-covariance matrix. All tests
are reported in Table 2.
The ﬁrst column refers to the benchmark model. As can be seen from
Table 2, the grant variable and the sum of grants and tax base signiﬁcantly
aﬀect the municipal expenditures. The estimate and t-value of the parameter
associated with the grant variable supports the existence of a ﬂypaper eﬀect.
The point estimate of the ﬂypaper eﬀect becomes (∂g/∂b)/(∂g/∂¯ w)=2 .88,
which is somewhat smaller than in previous studies.25
T u r n i n gt ot h ee ﬀects of local characteristics (the vector x), the results are
qualitatively similar to those of earlier comparable literature on local public
expenditures. Political preferences have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the expendi-
tures, but the political strength in the municipal parliament does not. The
results suggest that a municipality represented by a large share of socialist
parties are associated with higher public expenditures than other municipal-
ities, ceteris paribus. Regarding other municipal characteristics, recall that
the municipalities are responsible for providing comprehensive education and
elderly care. We ﬁnd that the higher the share of individuals in the age cor-
responding to upper secondary education (age 16-18), and the higher the
share of the oldest residents in the municipality (age 75-), the higher the per
capita expenditures. The results also indicate that the per capita expendi-
25Based on Swedish data collected during a period with speciﬁc grants (before 1993),
Aronsson and Wikstr¨ om (1995) simulated the eﬀect of replacing a system of speciﬁcg r a n t s
with a system of general grants and predicted that the ﬂypaper eﬀect would be about 6
in a new system of general grants.
18ture decreases as the population density in the municipality increases, which
indicates that the municipalities beneﬁt from economics of scale.
The estimation results for equation (14) are presented in the second col-
umn. The standard deviation of private income has neither a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the local public expenditures, nor the estimated magnitude of the
ﬂypaper eﬀect. The parameter estimate of the ﬂypaper eﬀect is nearly un-
aﬀected as the spread of income increases, whereas an F-test rejects the null
that β1 = β4 =0( χ2 =9 7 .71).
The third column26 refers to the model where the municipalities with
a high share of low-income earners are distinguished by a dummy variable
(d = 1 if the share of low-income earners in the municipality is larger than
the share of low-income earners in the country). As can be seen from Table
2, the ﬂypaper eﬀect is larger for municipalities with a higher share of low-
income earners, (∂g/∂b)/(∂g/∂¯ w)=3 .66, than for the other municipalities,
(∂g/∂b)/(∂g/∂¯ w)=2 .60. An F-test rejects the null that β1 = β4 = β7 =0
(χ2 =3 7 .79) and a Likelihood ratio-test rejects the null hypothesis that the
dummy variable does not explain local public expenditures.
26The qualitative results in models [III]a n d[ IV] are unaﬀected if the standard devia-
tion, ˜ sit, is excluded.
19Table 2. Estimation results (period 1996-2004) per capita.
[I][ II][ III][ IV]
b0 . 3 5 4 ∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗
(9.79) (9.88) (5.41) (6.69)
θ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(12.07) (9.56) (8.61) (6.78)
˜ s2 . 2 1 ×10−8 1.53×10−8 -7.44×10−8
(0.35) (0.25) (-1.09)
˜ sb -3.49×10−12 -2.73×10−12 1.85×10−12
(-1.26) (-1.00) (0.63)












Left 21.21∗∗ 22.15∗∗ 19.79∗ 18.26∗
(2.05) (2.14) (1.92) (1.83)
Herf -7.83 -7.12 -3.16 1.88
(-0.57) (-0.51) (-0.23) (0.14)
Unempl 57.48 71.25 90.90∗∗ 112.2∗∗
(1.27) (1.57) (2.00) (2.47)
(Continued on next page).
20Table 2. (Continued).
[I][ II][ III][ IV]
Age 0-6 90.93 69.75 85.89 83.16
(0.84) (0.65) (0.79) (0.72)
Age 7-15 96.97 81.32 113.6 231.8∗∗
(1.16) (0.97) (1.33) (2.42)
Age 16-18 732.4∗∗∗ 715.27∗∗∗ 691.8∗∗∗ 726.1∗∗∗
(5.05) (4.93) (4.74) (4.91)
Age 65-74 -256.3∗∗∗ -223.6∗∗ -179.7∗ -184.0∗∗
(-2.86) (-2.47) (-1.94) (-2.00)
Age 75- 314.5∗∗∗ 205.9∗∗∗ 316.8∗∗∗ 199.3∗
(2.84) (2.75) (2.78) (1.69)
Dens -9.45×104∗∗∗ -7.70×104∗∗∗ -8.35×104∗∗∗ -9.69×104∗∗∗
(-3.79) (-2.93) (-3.15) (-3.75)
Adjusted R2 0.878 0.879 0.880 0.881
F, Listed variable 27.02 21.82 18.12 17.85
F, Individual eﬀects 842.92 786.57 698.38 758.90
F, Time eﬀects 37.26 38.07 36.59 34.33
χ2 Fixed vs Random 148.27 120.90 137.60 38.27
Hettest 1.0×1030 9.8×1029 19553.1 1.3×1030
DW 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.22
LR Extensions vs [I] 14.08 36.34 93.00
LR Extensions vs [II] 22.26 78.92
No. of observations 2566 2566 2566 2566
No. of groups 287 287 287 287
Note: t-values in parentheses (obtained by using White’s estimator
of the variance-covariance matrix). The regressions in Table 2 include
municipality speciﬁce ﬀects and period speciﬁce ﬀects. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗
denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
Finally, the estimation of the model including the square of b and θ,
respectively, is presented in the fourth column. The quadratic eﬀects are
signiﬁcant. The advantage of including the quadratic eﬀe c t si st h a tt h e y
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allow for a more ﬂexible interpretation of the ﬂypaper eﬀect, meaning that
the size of the ﬂypaper eﬀect varies among municipalities depending on the
relative composition of grant and tax base. A large proportion of grant
in relation to the sum of grants and tax base corresponds to a relatively
high number of low-income earners. An F-test rejects the null that β1 =
β4 = β9 =0( χ2 =4 5 .69) whereas Likelihood ratio-tests reject that the
ﬁrst two models ﬁt the data better than the quadratic model. The ﬂypaper
eﬀect is illustrated graphically in Figure 1 by plotting it against the ratio
between grants and the sum of grants and tax base for each municipality and
each year.27 According to Figure 1, the size of the ﬂypaper eﬀect becomes
larger as the grants increase relative to the sum of grant and tax base. The
27An illustration of the ﬂypaper eﬀect by plotting it against the relative number of
low-income earners in the municipality gives the same picture as Figure 1.
22point estimate of the ﬂypaper eﬀect is about eight for the municipality with
the highest share of grants in relation to the sum of grants and tax base,
whereas it takes a negative value for the municipalities with the lowest share
of grants.28
A functional form that is linear-in-variables is most frequently used in
the empirical literature dealing explicitly with the ﬂypaper eﬀect. Likeli-
hood ratio-tests reject the linear model against the more general quadratic
alternative (see above). However, some researchers argue in favour of using a
logarithmic functional form (Becker, 1996; Worthington and Dollery, 1999).
A Pe-test, developed by MacKinnon, White, and Davidson (1983), implies
that the quadratic model (where the underlying explanatory variables are not
transformed into logarithms) is preferred to a logarithmic speciﬁcation.29 It
is diﬃcult to compare results from the logarithmic model with results from
the models discussed above because the parameters in the logarithmic model
refer to elasticities rather than marginal eﬀects. The results from estimat-
ing a logarithmic version of the model are, nevertheless, presented in the
Appendix.
28The negative values in Figure 1 can, most likely, be explained by a poor ﬁt between
the data and the functional form in the tails.
29A Box-Cox transformation rejects the functional form of the benchmark model, both
when it is linear-in-variables and when it is logarithmic in all variables. However, the
estimates of the transformed parameters in the Box-Cox model are closer to result in a
model that is linear-in-variables, and the χ2-statistic is closer not to reject this functional
form.
234C o n c l u s i o n
The model for local public expenditures considered in this paper implies that
the income distribution in the municipality matters for the majority voters’
marginal valuation of diﬀerent sources of public revenue. Speciﬁcally, this
paper found that the average tax base, the income spread in the municipality
and the share of low-income earners all contribute to the existence and size of
the ﬂypaper eﬀect. The model implies that the eﬀect on the majority voters’
tax share, caused by a change in the tax base, will be crucial for ﬁnding
a ﬂypaper eﬀect. In the case of a single ability-type in the local economy,
there is no ﬂypaper eﬀect, and the results correspond to a representative
agent model.
The empirical analysis is based on panel data containing between 282
and 287 Swedish municipalities and nine years, 1996-2004. The benchmark
model, which corresponds to previous empirical literature, results in a point
estimate of the ﬂypaper eﬀect of about three. However, Likelihood ratio-
tests reject the benchmark speciﬁcation when it is tested against more gen-
eral models. The ﬁrst extension of the benchmark model introduces the
standard deviation of private income and ﬁnds that this measure of income
dispersion does not seem to aﬀect the size of the ﬂypaper eﬀect. The second
extension aims to examine whether the size of the ﬂypaper eﬀe c ti sl a r g e ri n
municipalities where the share of low-income earners is relatively high. This
is examined by using a dummy variable-approach. The results imply that
t h es i z eo ft h eﬂypaper eﬀect is larger in municipalities where a relatively
high share of the residents are low-income earners. Finally, the model that
includes the quadratic eﬀects allows for a more ﬂexible interpretation of the
ﬂypaper eﬀect, meaning that the size of the ﬂypaper eﬀect varies among
24municipalities depending on the relative composition of grant and tax base.
The estimation results illustrate that the ﬂypaper eﬀect becomes larger as the
proportion of grants in relation to the sum of grant and tax base increases.
25Appendix
 i and the Flypaper Eﬀect













Rewriting equation (11) in terms of  i gives that ∂g/∂b =0w h e n i =0 ,
and ∂g/∂b > 0w h e n| i| > 0. The underlying mechanism is seen in equation
(A2) and is illustrated in Figure 2(I), which for simplicity assumes a linear
relationship between ∂g/∂b and | i|. Equation (A2) implies that ∂g/∂b =0
when vi
c is constant, i.e. when  i = 0, because if vi
c is constant, g must remain
constant as well for equation (A2) to apply. An increase in | i| changes the
curvature of the utility function (with respect to private consumption) and
makes it possible to increase g by increasing b.
Besides aﬀecting the marginal utility of private consumption (i.e. the
second term on the left hand side of equation (A2)), an increase in ¯ w will
also have indirect eﬀects on the local public expenditures via the tax share
of each ability-type; an eﬀect which arises via ψi in equation (A2). A change
in  i,t h e r e f o r e ,r e s u l t si nal a r g e re ﬀect on ∂g/∂¯ w relative to the eﬀect on
∂g/∂b.
Rewriting equation (10) in terms of  i gives that ∂g/∂¯ w 6=0w h e n i =0 .
In the situation where the low-income earners are the majority voters we
ﬁnd that ∂g/∂¯ w<0w h e n i = 0, because an increase in ¯ w will increase the
26tax share of the low-income earners (i.e. decrease ψi in equation (A2)) and,
therefore, has to be balanced by a decrease in g.N o w , b y i n c r e a s i n g | i|,
the eﬀect via the tax share dominates the eﬀect on the marginal utility of
private consumption until | i| = κ>0, when ∂g/∂¯ w = 0 (see Figure 2(II)).
The relation between  i and the ﬂypaper eﬀect is illustrated in Figure 2(IV).
I ft h el o w - i n c o m ee a r n e r sa r ei nm a j o r i t y ,aﬂypaper eﬀect will exist when
κ<| i| < 1, and a ’negative’ ﬂypaper eﬀe c tw i l le x i s tw h e n| i| > 1.
The marginal eﬀects on spending of ¯ w and b w i l lb et h es a m ei f ,a n do n l y
if, | i| = 1. To see this, start by taking the derivative of the local public
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To derive the expressions for ∂t/∂ ¯ w and ∂t/∂b, respectively, we begin by
substituting equation (7) into equation (6), which gives a modiﬁed ﬁrst-order
condition for the tax rate;
Ωt = −(¯ w −
nj




j)¯ wzg =0 ( A 5 )
Diﬀerentiating with respect to t, ¯ w and b, while using that g = t(ni+nj)¯ w+
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Substituting equations (A6)-(A7) into equations (A3) and (A4), and rear-
ranging gives (rewrite vi
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(A9)
Note that the indirect eﬀects on the local government expenditures via the
tax shares of both ability-types disappear as  i = −1, and so does the ﬂypaper
eﬀect, i.e. (∂g/∂b)/(∂g/∂¯ w)=1 .
Finally, let us also consider the situation where the high-income earners
are in the majority (see Figure 2(III)). In this case we ﬁnd that ∂g/∂¯ w>0
when  i = 0, because an increase in ¯ w will increase the tax share of the high-
income earners and, therefore, has to be balanced by an increase in g.A sa
consequence, an increase in  i results in a smaller eﬀect on ∂g/∂¯ w relative to
the eﬀect on ∂g/∂b.Aﬂypaper eﬀect will exist when | i| > 1, and a ’negative’
ﬂypaper eﬀect will exist when 0 < | i| < 1( s e eF i g u r e2 ( V ) ) .T h em a r g i n a l
eﬀects of ¯ w and b on spending will be the same if, and only if, | i| =1 .































Table A1. Description of the variables
Variable Description
g Total net operational expenditures (SEK per capita).
b Total unconditional grants to the municipality (SEK per capita).
¯ w Taxable income in the municipality (SEK per capita).
˜ s The standard deviation from the mean income in the
municipality (SEK).
d A dummy variable that equals one if the share of low-income
earners in the municipality is larger than the share of low-income
earners in the country. A low-income earner is deﬁned as a
citizen earning less than 200,000 SEK per year. The earnings
are adjusted by the Swedish CPI (2004 is the base year).
Left The percentage of the seats in the municipal parliament held
by Social Democrats and members of the Left Party.
Herf A herﬁndahl index measuring political strength in the
municipal parliament.
Unempl The percentage of unemployed.
Age 0-6 The percentage of residents aged 6 or younger.
Age 7-15 The percentage of residents aged 7-15.
Age 16-18 The percentage of residents aged 16-18.
Age 65-74 The percentage of residents aged 65-74.
Age 75- The percentage of residents aged 75 or older.
Dens The population density, residents per square kilometre.
This variable is divided by the factor ten thousand
for computational purposes.
Note: g, b, w and ˜ s are adjusted by the Swedish CPI (2004 is base year).
The income variable used for calculating ˜ s and d is based on the population
aged 16 and above.
30Table A2.S u m m a r ys t a t i s t i c s
1996 2004 1996-2004
Variable Mean Std.dv. Mean Std.dv. Mean Std.dv.
g 29199.8 3487.6 36838.9 3871.0 33042.5 4482.8
b 5733.7 3884.6 7287.3 5502.4 6795.4 4557.8
w 97666.6 12851.1 128842.1 17212.2 111336.7 17815.2
˜ sa) 5.71×108 3.15×109 4.46×108 7.56×109 3.49×108 5.90×109
Left 50.77 11.94 46.82 11.19 47.79 11.73
Herf 29.82 5.77 25.22 4.64 25.96 5.29
Unempl 7.23 1.94 3.92 1.12 4.62 2.00
Age0-6 9.08 0.95 7.07 1.09 7.67 1.22
Age7-15 11.53 1.03 12.10 1.11 12.32 1.17
Age16-18 3.66 0.38 4.12 0.37 3.76 0.40
Age65-74 9.51 1.72 9.48 1.57 9.35 1.64
Age75- 9.18 2.21 9.78 2.25 9.58 2.26
Dens 0.0114 0.0389 0.0118 0.0411 0.0116 0.401
a) The extreme values are created by poor ﬁt (in a few municipalities) between
the income distribution and the lognormal density function, which is used when
the standard deviation is calculated. Even if some of the observations show
high values, this is not considered as suﬃcient for excluding the observations.
Nevertheless, omitting the extreme values from the analysis had no eﬀect on the
qualitative results discussed in Section 3.
The Logarithmic Estimation Results
Studies that use a functional form that is linear-in-variables often ﬁnd sup-
port for a ﬂypaper eﬀect, while studies that use a functional form that is
logarithmic in all variables do not ﬁnd any support (Becker, 1996; Worthing-
ton and Dollery, 1999). The reader should note that a logarithmic estimation
yields coeﬃcients equal to elasticities and not marginal eﬀects on spending.
31In order to compare the results, the estimated elasiticities are often con-
verted into marginal eﬀects. The marginal eﬀects on spending by an increase















Does the use of a logarithmic functional form alter the results discussed in
the empirical part of this paper? The model to be estimated is written.30
lngit = β0 + β1 lnbit + β2 lnθit + β6 lnxit + µi + γt + εit (A10)
An extended version of equation (A10) which aims to test whether the ﬂy-
paper eﬀect is larger for municipalities with a higher share of low-income
earners than for other municipalities is estimated.
lngit = β0 + β1 lnbit + β2 lnθit + β3dit + β4dit lnbit (A11)
+β5dit lnθit + β6 lnxit + µi + γt + εit
T h ee s t i m a t i o nr e s u l t sa r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l eA 3 . T h eﬁrst column in
Table A3 refers to the estimation for a simpliﬁed version of equation (A11)
30The observations where the municipality’s total grant revenue is non-positive are ex-
cluded in order to make a logarithmic estimation possible. The sample will, therefore, be
reduced by 123 observations. This leaves us with an unbalanced panel containing between
265 and 282 municipalities. Furthermore, the standard deviation of private income in each
municipality for each year, ˜ s, is excluded due to collinarity problems.
32where β3 = β4 = β5 = 0. The null hypothesis (β1 =0 )m e a n st h a tt h e
elasticity of the grant variable equals the elasticity of θ. Following Becker
(1996), and calculating the marginal eﬀects at the means, the point estimate
of the ﬂypaper eﬀect in this model becomes (∂g/∂b)/(∂g/∂w)=1 .30. The
estimate of the marginal eﬀect of grants is less than the estimate reported
in Section 3. This results in a smaller ﬂypaper eﬀect than in the benchmark
model. The t-value of the grant coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent
level.
The results of estimating equation (A11) are reported in the second col-
umn. The results imply that the ﬂypaper eﬀect is larger for municipalities
with a relatively high share of low-income earners, (∂g/∂b)/(∂g/∂w)=2 .22,
than for the other municipalities, (∂g/∂b)/(∂g/∂w)=1 .26. The qualitative
result in this model is, therefore, equivalent to the result presented in Section
3 (even if the size of the ﬂypaper eﬀect is smaller in the logarithmic model).
An F-test rejects the null that β1 = β4 =0( χ2 =1 3 .82).


















Age 0 − 6 -3.26×10−4 0.006
(-0.02) (0.24)
Age 7 − 15 0.091∗∗ 0.083∗∗
(2.50) (2.28)
Age 16 − 18 0.070∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(4.23) (3.75)
Age 65 − 74 -0.021 -0.013
(-0.80) (-0.47)
Age 75− 0.035 0.039
(1.06) (1.18)





Adjusted R2 0.877 0.878
F, Listed variable 15.63 13.76
F, Individual eﬀects 781.87 680.72
F, Time eﬀects 27.23 28.55




No. of observations 2443 2443
No. of groups 282 282
Note: t-values in parentheses (obtained by using White’s estimator
of the variance-covariance matrix). The regressions in Table 1 include
municipality speciﬁce ﬀects and period speciﬁce ﬀects. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗
denote signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
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